The Law of Divorce Fifteen Years after Williams v. North Carolina by Baer, Herbert R.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 36 | Number 3 Article 1
4-1-1958
The Law of Divorce Fifteen Years after Williams v.
North Carolina
Herbert R. Baer
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Herbert R. Baer, The Law of Divorce Fifteen Years after Williams v. North Carolina, 36 N.C. L. Rev. 265 (1958).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol36/iss3/1
THE LAW OF DIVORCE FIFTEEN YEARS
AFTER WILLIAMS v. NORTH CAROLINA
HERB" RT R. BAER*
In December 1942, the United States Supreme Court announced
that it overruled Haddock v. Haddock' and rendered its first decision in
the epoch making case of Williams v. North Carolina.2  Three years
later the Court handed down its second decision in that case.3 Ever
since, the trial and appellate courtrooms of the land have resounded
with arguments of counsel based on one or the other of the Williams
decisions. The instances in which those two opinions have been cited
in the state and lower federal courts are truly legion.
But, although precedent shattering, the Williams cases left un-
decided many aspects of marital litigation. Rights to alimony, custody
of children, property interests of children and alleged widows, and the
rights of the parties themselves to attack divorces which they fraudu-
lently obtained were among those problems left for a later day.
In 1945 the writer set forth a detailed account of the trial and
appellate litigation in the Williams cases together with a discussion of
the theories of the majority, concurring, and dissenting Justices.4 In
1950 he reviewed at length the interim pronouncements of the Supreme
Court which had brought into play the principles declared in the Wil-
liams cases.5  In the period since 1950 the Court has decided several
cases in the matrimonial field which are of considerable significance
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
201 U.S. 562 (1906). The Haddock case was an action by a wife for separa-
tion and alimony. The Willians case, on the other hand, was a prosecution for
bigamous cohabitation. The two cases, therefore, are not on "all fours" and it is
for this reason that it has been contended the Supreme Court, despite its specific
language, did not overrule Haddock. See Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Over-
ruled?, 18 IND. L.J. 165 (1943); Holt, The Bones of Haddock v. Haddock, 41
MicH. L. Rv. 1013 (1943) ; NoTE, 45 COLum. L. Rtv. 797 (1945). It has also
been asserted that subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, such as Estin v.
Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948), discussed later in this paper, indicate that the Haddock
case is still very much alive. See Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 HARv. L. Rv.
1287 (1951).
2 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
'Williams v. North Carolina. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
'Baer, So Your Client Wants A Divorce, 24 N.C.L. R-v. 1 (1945). For other
contemporary articles see Corwin, Out-Haddocking Haddock, 93 U. PA. L. REv.
341 (1945) ; Powell, And Repent At Leisure, 58 HARv. L. REv. 930 (1945); Stum-
berg, Jurisdiction to Divorce, 24 TEXAs L. REv. 119 (1946).
'Baer, The Aftermath of Williams v. North Carolina, 28 N.C.L. REv. 265
(1950).
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to the lawyer who is interested, not only in the validity of the divorce
he has obtained for his client, but also in the effect such divorce will
have on matters other than the mere disrupting of the marriage status.
It will be the purpose of this paper to review in detail those cases
in the area of matrimonial law which the Supreme Court has decided
since 1950 and, at the same time, to give a summary review of the
Court's decisions prior to 1950 in which it further elaborated upon or
relied on the Williams decisions as controlling authority. By so doing,
it is hoped the reader will have a complete picture of the law in the area
of divorce as declared by the United States Supreme Court from 1942
to date.
In order to enable the reader to better appraise the action of the
Court in cases following Williams, we shall first briefly summarize the
facts and the holdings of the Court in that case. For convenience, here-
after the first Williams case will be referred to as Williams 1st and the
second as Williams 2nd.
Williams and Mrs. Hendrix were both domiciliaries of North Caro-
lina. They abandoned their respective spouses in that state, took the
well known trail to Nevada, obtained Nevada divorces, promptly mar-
ried each other there, and then returned to North Carolina where they
lived as man and wife. Neither of the divorce suit defendants appeared
or were served with process in Nevada. North Carolina 'prosecuted both
Williams and Mrs. Hendrix for bigamous cohabitation and convictions
obtained at the first trial were sustained by the state supreme court.(
Although North Carolina had initially challenged the validity of the
Nevada divorces on two grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
divorce suit defendants in Nevada, and (2) lack of domicile of Williams
and Mrs. Hendrix in that state, the second ground was abandoned on
the argument of the appeal before the United States Supreme Court in
Williams 1st. For the purposes of the argument at that time it was
assumed that Williams and Mrs. Hendrix had acquired a valid domicile
in Nevada. The sole contention of the state of North Carolina then
was that since Williams and Mrs. Hendrix had abandoned their spouses
in North Carolina and since neither Mrs. Williams nor Mr. Hendrix
had appeared or been served with process in Nevada, North Carolina
did not have to recognize the Nevada divorce decrees as a bar to its
bigamy prosecutions. In making this contention, the state of North
Carolina relied upon and was supported by the case of Haddock v.
Haddock,7 for in Haddock the Supreme Court had laid down the rule
that a decree of divorce rendered by a state in which the husband
'State v. Williams. 220 N.C. 445, 17 S.E.2d 769 (1941).
See note 1 supra.
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has a bona fide domicile is not entitled to full faith and credit in the
state of matrimonial domicile in which the wife still resides when it
appears that the husband has abandoned the wife and that she has
not been personally served with process in the divorcing state.
But this rule of Haddock was destined to meet its doom and with
its demise there was nothing to support the convictions obtained in
Williams 1st. Jurisdiction to divorce, said the Court, is predicated on
domicile-not fault.8 The domiciliary state of the plaintiff may grant a
valid divorce even though the plaintiff was a wrongdoer and even though
the defendant who had been abandoned neither appeared nor was
served with process in the divorcing state. "Haddock v. Haddock is
overruled."
While the foregoing paragraph accurately states the position of the
Supreme Court as declared in Williams 1st, it might be well if we tie
down the rule of law there set forth to the fact situation. Upon so
doing we find that what the Supreme Court specifically decided in
Williams 1st is this: A spouse who abandons his mate may acquire a
domicile in another state; that state may grant him a divorce even
though the abandoned spouse is neither served nor appears in the
divorcing state; and such a divorce will be a complete defense to a
prosecution for bigamy by the state of the original marital domicile.
What the other effects of said divorce may be was not determined in
Williams 1st. Later decisions, as we shall see, answer this question
in a piecemeal fashion.
A second trial took place in the Williams cases because in its
remand and reversal the Supreme Court in Williams 1st made this
provocative comment:
Nor do we reach here the question as to the power of North
Carolina to refuse full faith and credit to Nevada divorce decrees
because, contrary to the finding of the Nevada court, North Caro-
lina finds that no bona fide domicile was acquired in Nevada.' 0
Accordingly, on the remand the sole issue at the second trial was
whether or not the defendants had acquired a domicile in Nevada. If
not, the jury was told the Nevada divorces would be no bar to a con-
viction. The jury found that Williams and Mrs. Hendrix had never
acquired a domicile in Nevada, there was another verdict of guilty, and
again the convictions were sustained by the state supreme court.,'
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court the convictions in
8317 U.S. at 301.
o Id. at 304. As to this language of the Court see the references set out in
note 1 supra.10 Id. at 302.11224 N.C. 183, 29 S.E.2d 744 (1944).
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Williams 2nd were affirmed. The Court answered the question raised
by it in Williams 1st. The full faith and credit requirement did not
prevent North Carolina from inquiring into the existence of jurisdiction
in the Nevada court. There was such jurisdiction only if Williams and
Mrs. Hendrix had acquired a domicile in that state. North Carolina,
prosecuting the defendants in the protection of its social institutions, had
fairly found no domicile in Nevada. It had accorded to the Nevada
decrees all the respect to which they were entitled under the full faith
and credit clause.
Of course, the state of North Carolina was not a party and had not
appeared in the Nevada divorce proceedings. The Supreme Court
made this significant statement in upholding the action of North Caro-
lina:
[T]hose not parties to a litigation ought not to be foreclosed by
the interested actions of others; especially not a State which is
concerned with the vindication of its own social policy .... 12
Once again, while the language just stated, "those not parties," is
hecessarily broad, it behooves us to note that the party actually involved
was the state of marital domicile.' 3 Whether any other state, or any in-
terested person who was not a party to the Nevada proceedings would
have the same privilege that was accorded to North Carolina was not
decided in Williams 2nd.
However, the Court left no doubt as to the position of the spouse who
had been left at home, for on the same day of its decision in Williams
2nd, it also decided Esenwein v. Commonwealth ex rel. Esenwein.14
It there held, on the basis of the principles announced in Williams 2nd,
that a wife residing in the marital domicile of Pennsylvania could
defeat the husband's attempt to revoke a support order issued by a
Pennsylvania court by showing that the husband, who was predicating
his right to relief on a later acquired ex parte Nevada divorce, had never
acquired a domicile in Nevada.
It is important to emphasize that in both the Williams and Esenwein
cases the Nevada proceedings were ex parte. What the power of North
Carolina would have been had the divorce suit spouses appeared in
Nevada was not decided in Williams. The rights of spouses who ap-
pear in the divorcing state in which neither is domiciled were to be
determined by later decisions.' 5 In this paper we shall discuss only
' 325 U.S. at 230.
's Where in this Article the term "marital domicile" is used, it refers to the
state in which the parties were living as husband and wife before the institution
of the divorce proceedings.
"325 U.S. 279 (1945).
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) ; Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948),
considered in detail later in this Article.
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those situations which have been passed upon by the Supreme Court
since the Williams cases. It will not be our purpose to assume hypo-
thetical circumstances and endeavor to devise the answer the Court
might or should give in such cases. Whatever may be said as to other
fields of law, it is particularly true that in the realm of divorce litigation
an attorney can only express an opinion with reasonable assurance if
the facts of his own case are what may be fairly said to be "on all
fours" with those of a Supreme Court decision. In the following pages
sections will be entitled with the rule of law as determined by Supreme
Court holdings. The ensuing discussion will consider the case authori-
ties in which the rule was declared. The order in which the various
rules are stated does not indicate the chronological sequence of the
decisions.
I
A HuSBAND'S EX PARTE DIVORCE OBTAINED IN His NEW STATE
OF DOMICILE DOES NOT BAR THE ENFORCEMENT IN THE STATE
OF MARITAL DOMICILE OF A SUPPORT DECREE OBTAINED BY THE
WIFE IN THE LATTER STATE PRIOR TO THE INSTITUTION OF
THE DIVORCE PROCEEDING.
ESTIN V. ESTIN AND KREIGER V. KREIGER
It will be recalled that in the Esenwein case the husband's ex parte
Nevada divorce was held ineffective as a bar to a prior support order
in the marital domicile of Pennsylvania because the husband had not
acquired a domicile in the divorcing state. What the rights of the
parties would be in the event the husband had acquired a domicile in
Nevada was up for decision in the Estin16 and Kreiger17 cases, in which
the Supreme Court announced the rule set out above. The facts in
both cases are substantially the same. In each, the state of New York,
which was the state of marital domicile, decreed support payments to
the wife in an action in which the defendant husband appeared. There-
after, the husband went to Nevada, established his domicile, and obtained
a Nevada divorce. The decree made no provision for alimony. The
defendant wife did not appear in the divorce litigation and was not
served with process in the divorcing state. With his divorce in hand,
the husband ceased making payments under the support judgment.
The wife then instituted suit in New York for arrearages due under
the support order. The husband appeared in that suit and pleaded as
18334 U.S. 541 (1948).
334 U.S. 555 (1948). The 'Estin and Kreiger cases will be found noted in
many law reviews. See, e.g., 27 N.C.L. Ray. 134 (1948); 16 U. CHL L. REV. 151
(1948) ; 34 CORNELL L.Q. 263 (1948) ; 33 MINN. L. Ray. 307 (1949). See also
Carey and MacChesney, Divisible Divorce Decrees, 64 HtAuv. L. Rav. 1287 (1951).
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a defense the Nevada decree. The New York Court of Appeals held
that, although the divorce was valid, the Nevada decree was no bar to
the wife's action and gave judgment for the arrearages.
The United States Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Doug-
las, affirmed the New York judgments. The full faith and credit clause
was held in no way violated by the New York action even though the
New York court was obliged to recognize that the Nevada divorce
dissolved the bonds of matrimony. It was for New York to say
whether a support order survived an ex parte divorce. In upholding
the New York action Justice Douglas gave two grounds for his de-
cision: (1) New York had a legitimate interest in seeing that the
wife, domiciled in its state, did not become a public charge; and (2)
the prior New York judgment for support created a property interest
in the wife which the state of Nevada could not take away from her
in the absence of jurisdiction over her person. The Court recognized
that its decision gave to the Nevada divorce a "divisible" character.
It was effective in destroying the marriage status but ineffective as to a
prior support order which had been obtained as one of the incidents of
the marriage relation.' 8
II
WHEN THE WIFE ACQUIRES A NEW DOMICILE AND THE Hus-
BAND OBTAINS AN EX PARTE DIVORCE IN THE STATE OF MARI-
TAL DOMICILE THE WIFE MAY THEREAFTER OBTAIN A VALID
SUPPORT DECREE IN HER NEW STATE OF DOMICILE.
ARMSTRONG v. ARMSTRONG
While the Estin and Kreiger cases dealt with support orders issued
prior to the divorce decrees, it was not until 1956 that the Supreme
Court first passed upon the validity of a support order issued after the
husband had obtained a valid ex parte divorce. The situation arose in
Armstrong v. Armstrong.'9 The Armstrongs had been married in
Ohio, where they lived for several years as man and wife, and then moved
to Florida, where they continued their marital existence. In 1950,
friction having developed between them, Mrs. Armstrong left their
Florida home and took up her domicile in Ohio, where the Armstrongs
still retained certain property interests. In 1951 Mr. Armstrong filed
suit for divorce in Florida. Mrs. Armstrong was served by publication
" For a discussion of the dissenting opinions filed by Justices Jackson and
Frankfurter, see Baer, The Aftermath of Williams v. North Carolina, 28 N.C.L.
REv. 265, 284 (1950).
9 350 U.S. 568 (1956), 8 WESTERN REs. L. REv. 96, 45 GEo. L.J. 290 (1957),
10 VAiNb. L. REv. 435 (1957).
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only and did not appear in the Florida proceeding. In due course
Armstrong obtained an ex parte divorce. It appeared that Mrs. Arm-
strong had taken into her possession from a jointly held safe deposit
box certain non-negotiable securities which were registered in the
name of Armstrong.
In the divorce decree the Florida court said that Mrs. Armstrong
"has not come into this court in good faith or made any claim to the
equitable conscience of the court and has made no showing of any need
on her part for alimony. It is, therefore, specifically decreed that no
award of alimony be made to the defendant." 20 The decree also stated
that Mrs. Armstrong "is hereby directed and specifically ordered to
return the said stock certificates and bonds to the plaintiff within 15
days." 2 '
Thereafter, in 1952, Mrs. Armstrong brought suit for divorce and
alimony in Ohio. Armstrong appeared in the action. The Ohio court
denied Mrs. Armstrong a divorce, holding that the Florida decree ob-
tained by Armstrong was valid and conclusive as to the destruction
of the marriage relation. However, the Ohio court did grant *Mrs.
Armstrong her request for alimony and ordered Armstrong to transfer
to her, as such alimony, the very stocks which the Florida court had
directed she return to him. The United States Supreme Court affirmed
the Ohio judgment.
While all the Justices were in favor of affirming the judgment, there
was a sharp difference in their views, as shown by the majority and
concurring opinions. The husband contended that the Ohio court had
failed to give full faith and credit to the Florida decree, which he
asserted not only terminated the marriage status, but also decreed that
the wife was not entitled to alimony.
The divergent views of the Supreme Court Justices stem from the
fact that they do not agree on what the Florida decree adjudicated as
to alimony. Mr. Justice Minton, for the majority, said:
As we interpret the Florida decree, however, the Florida court
did not purport to adjudicate the absent wife's right to alimony.
The Ohio courts, therefore, in awarding alimony to the wife,
did not fail to give full faith and credit to the Florida decree.
Accordingly, we do not reach the constitutional question sought
to be presented. But even if there is doubt as to the meaning
of the Florida decree, we should construe its action as a refusal
to pass on the question of alimony and thus avoid the consti-
tutional question as to its power to do so. 2 2 (Emphasis added.)
20 350 U.S. at 569.
"Id. at 575 n. 1 (concurring opinion).22350 U.S. at 569. Interestingly enough, a few days after this case was
argued before the Supreme Court, the author received a letter dated November
1958]
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In referring to that language of the decree in which the Florida
court said, "It is, therefore, specifically decreed that no award of ali-
mony be made to the defendant," the Supreme Court majority said:
Taken literally, that language means only that, for the reasons
it gave, the court would refrain from making an affirmative award
of alimony to the wife, not that it adjudicated in favor of the
husband that his wife was not entitled to alimony . . . . The
court simply said that no award of alimony be made-a purely
negative assertion that it would not pass on the question. 3
Under the hypothesis then, that the Florida decree merely divorced
the parties and did not adjudicate the subject of alimony, the majority
of the Supreme Court finds that Ohio did give full faith and credit to
the Florida decree. It had recognized the divorce as valid and its
awarding of alimony in no way conflicted with the decree.
Justice Frankfurter joined in the opinion of the Court by Justice
Minton but further stated that, as he saw it, the Florida decree ex-
pressly refrained from passing on the rights of the parties to property
located in Ohio and that of course Ohio could and did pass on that
matter.
CONCURRING OPINION BY JUSTICE BLACK
Justice Black wrote the concurring opinion. He was joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices Douglas and Clark. The difference in view
is pointed up at the outset of his opinion:
The opinion of the Court takes the position that the Florida
court did not adjudicate Mrs. Armstrong's right to alimony.
We cannot agree.
2 4
Referring to the language of the Florida decree he said,
This was plainly a denial of alimony, not on the ground that the
court was leaving the matter open but because the judge thought
the wife should not have alimony.2 5
In this situation Justice Black said there was a direct conflict be-
tween the Ohio decree which awarded alimony and the Florida decree
which denied it. Consequently he declares that the constitutional ques-
tion is before the court. Was Ohio justified in denying full faith and
credit to the no alimony aspect of the Florida decree? This question,
which the majority avoided, Justice Black decides.
He concludes that Ohio was not obliged to give full faith and credit
25, 1955, from Mr. Julius R. Samuels. one of the attorneys for Mr. Armstrong,
in which Mr. Samuels expressed some concern that the Court might "sidestep the
constitutional question." That is exactly what the majority did.
23 350 U.S. at 569-71. 24 Id. at 575.
2r Ibid.
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to that portion of the Florida decree. A judgment which denied ali-
mony is, as he sees it, a "personal judgment."26 Since Mrs. Armstrong
had not been served in Florida and had not appeared in the Florida
proceedings, that state was without jurisdiction to render such a per-
sonal judgment. He relies on Pennoyer v. Neff2 7 and asserts that the
Estin case "was much like this one." 28  While recognizing that in
Estin there was an outstanding support decree at the time of the di-
vorce, he finds that is immaterial.
The fact that Mrs. Estin's claim to support had been reduced to
judgment prior to divorce while Mrs. Armstrong's had not is not
a meaningful distinction. Mrs. Armstrong's right to support
before judgment, like Mrs. Estin's right to support after judg-
ment, is the kind of personal right which cannot be adjudicated
without personal service. 29  (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Armstrong's attorneys had sought to distinguish Estin on the
ground that in Estin the husband left the matrimonial domicile and
took on a new one in Nevada, while in Armstrong the husband re-
mained in the matrimonial domicile which decreed the divorce. He
urged, and was upheld in this by the Florida court, that the wife, if
found in the wrong, could not acquire a domicile of her own but that
she continued to have the domicile of her husband. Justice Black dis-
posed of this contention by declaring that the fiction which asserts a
woman cannot have a separate domicile is a relic of an old discredited
idea. Matrimonial domicile as a decisive factor was repudiated in the
Williams cases.
We adhere to what was said in the first Williams case: "the
question as to where the fault lies has no relevancy to the exist-
ence of state power in such circumstances." 30
One of the husband's other contentions was that personal service
on Mrs. Armstrong in Florida was not necessary because the Florida
court found she was domiciled in Florida at the time of the divorce
action there. Reliance was placed on Milliken v. Meyer.3 1 In disposing
of this contention Justice Black said the Florida court's finding of
domicile of the wife was made in an ex parte proceeding and therefore
was open to attack in Ohio. Finding ample evidence to support the
26Id. at 576. 2795 U.S. 714 (1878).
211350 U.S. at 576. 29 Id. at 577.
30 Id. at 578.
31311 U.S. 457 (1940). The Milliken case was not a divorce action. Meyer,
who was domiciled in Wyoming, was outside the state. In a suit brought against
him in Wyoming by Milliken, Meyer was personally served in another state.
Held, domicile of Meyer in Wyoming was a sufficient basis for extraterritorial
service. Also, since there had been actual personal service on Meyer outside the
state, the requirements of due process were satisfied.
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finding of domicile in Ohio by the Ohio court, Justice Black said,
"Consequently the husband's reliance on Milliken v. Meyer is mis-
placed. ' '3 2
In concluding the discussion of the Armstrong case, it is significant
to note certain factual differences between Armstrong and Estin.
1. In Estin the divorcing state was the state of the husband's
newly acquired domicile. In Armstrong it was the state of
marital domicile.
2. In Estin the support order which was enforced pre-existed
the divorce. In Armstrong it followed the divorce.
3. In Estin the state which made the support order was the
state of marital domicile. In Armstrong it is not, but it is the
state of the wife's newly acquired domicile.
4. In Estin the decree made no provision as to alimony. In
Armstrong the decree made specific reference to alimony
as to the nature of which the Supreme Court Justices dis-
agreed.
III
WHEN THE WIFE ACQUIRES A NEW DOMICILE AND THE Hus-
BAND OBTAINS AN EX PARTE DIVORCE IN ANOTHER STATE IN
WHICH HE ALSO ACQUIRED A NEW DOMICILE THE STATE OF
THE WIFE'S DOMICILE MAY AWARD SUPPORT NOTWITHSTAND-
ING THE DIVORCE DECREE EXPRESSLY TERMINATED THE Hus-
BAND'S OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT.
VANDERBILT V. VANDERBILT
Whatever uncertainties there might have been as to just what the
Florida court adjudicated relative to alimony in the Armstrong case,
all the justices found no uncertainty in the nature of the decree in
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,33 decided in 1957. Agreement as to the char-
acter of the alimony provision, however, did not eliminate dissenting
opinions.
The Vanderbilts had been married in 1948 and made their home in
California until they separated in 1952. In February 1953 Mrs. Vander-
bilt moved to New York where she established her domicile. The
following month Mr. Vanderbilt established his domicile in Nevada
and there filed a divorce action. Mrs. Vanderbilt was neither served
nor appeared in the Nevada proceeding. An ex parte divorce was in
due course granted and the decree specifically stated that the husband
and wife were "freed and released from the bonds of matrimony and
all the duties and obligations thereof."84 All the Supreme Court
32 350 U.S. at 578.
88354 U.S. 416 (1957).
"See id. at 417, where this language of the state decree is quoted by Justice
Black speaking for the majority.
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Justices agreed that this language was intended to end the husband's
duty to support the wife.
After the divorce decree Mrs. Vanderbilt instituted an action in
New York for separation and support. Since she could not get personal
service on Vanderbilt in New York, she sequestered certain property
he owned in that state. To protect his property interest, Vanderbilt
appeared specially and alleged that the full faith and credit clause re-
quired New York to treat the Nevada decree as not only terminating
the marriage status but also as ending his liability to support. The
New York Court of Appeals found that the Nevada decree did terminate
the marriage but held it was no bar to the granting of support to Mrs.
Vanderbilt by New York courts under a New York statute which
authorized support after divorce. 35
On certiorari the Supreme Court majority affirmed. Justices Frank-
furter and Harlan wrote separate dissenting opinions.
MAJORITY OPINION IN VANDERBILT
Justice Black, speaking for the majority, wasted no words. The
distinguishing feature between Estin and Vanderbilt he says, is that in
Estin the New York court was enforcing a pre-existing support order
while in Vanderbilt the support judgment followed the divorce. This
he held to be of no consequence.
In our opinion this difference is not material on the question
before us. Since the wife was not subject to its jurisdiction,
the Nevada divorce court had no power to extinguish any right
which she had under the law of New York to financial support
from her husband.36
The significant factor to Justice Black is that the right to receive
alimony is just as personal as the obligation to pay alimony. No court
can impose a personal obligation without jurisdiction over the person
and neither can a personal right be taken away without such jurisdic-
tion.
It has long been the constitutional rule that a court cannot
adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant. Here, the Nevada divorce
court was as powerless to cut off the wife's support right as it
would have been to order the husband to pay alimony if the wife
had brought the divorce action and he had not been subject to the
11N.Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT. § 1170-6: "In an action for divorce, separation or
annulment, ... where the court refuses to grant such relief by reason of a finding
by the court that a divorce . . . declaring the marriage a nullity had previously
been granted to the husband in an action in which jurisdiction over the person of
the wife was not obtained, the court may, nevertheless, render in the same action
such judgment as justice may require for the maintenance of the wife."
80 354 U.S. at 418.
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divorce court's jurisdiction. Therefore, the Nevada decree, to
the extent it purported to affect the wife's right to support, was
void and the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not obligate New
York to give it recognition.3 7  (Emphasis added.)
It will be recalled that it was Justice Black, who now speaks for
the majority, that spoke for the minority in the concurring opinion in
Armstrong v. Armstrong. Without further elaboration in the Vander-
bilt opinion, Justice Black noted it with a footnote in which he called
attention to his opinion in the Armstrong case, saying, "[T]he reasons
underlying this holding [are there] set forth in greater detail."38
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER'S DISSENT IN VANDERBILT
Justice Frankfurter's first criticism with the majority opinion is
that it now classifies as immaterial the fact that in Estin the support
order pre-existed the divorce decree when, as he sees it, that was
deemed very material at the time of the Estin decision.
Whatever the answer to the question may be, Estin v. Estin ...
does not supply it. What the Court now states to be "not
material" was crucial to the decision in that case, namely, the
prior New York support order, which the Court held Nevada
was required to respect by virtue of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, Art. IV, § 1, of the Constitution. That this fact was
crucial to the Court's decision in that case is made clear by'the
Court's reference to the prior New York judgment in its two
statements of the question presented and more than a half dozen
times throughout the course of its opinion. The Court rightly
regarded the fact as crucial because of the requirement of Art.
IV, § 1, that Nevada give full faith and credit to the prior New
York "judicial Proceeding." 9
However, Justice Frankfurter chiefly criticizes the majority opinion
because it treats the property -provision of the Nevada decree in a
different light than the provisions relating to the marriage status. The
majority, he states, denies Nevada had the power in an ex parte pro-
ceeding to affect the personal claims of the wife when looked at from
the property point of view, but permits the Nevada court to destroy the
personal claims the wife had in her married status. After saying, "I
stand on the Williams decisions," 40 Justice Frankfurter says that since
Nevada, under Williams, can destroy in an ex parte proceeding the
right of the wife to the marital relation, it may also in that same pro-
ceeding destroy any property interest that arises as an incident to the
marriage relation.
3 Id. at 418-19. 3" Id. at 419.
39Id. at 420. 40 Id. at 423.
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It cannot be assumed, by judicial notice as it were, that absent
spouses value their alimony rights more highly than their marital
rights. Factually, therefore, both situations involve the adjudica-
tion of valuable rights of an absent spouse, and I see no reason
to split the cause of action and hold that a domiciliary state can
ex parte terminate the marital relation but cannot ex parte
deny alimony. "Divisible divorce" is just name-calling.4 1
In short, since the full faith and credit clause is held to require
New York to honor that portion of the Nevada judgment which dis-
solves the marital relation, it follows, says Justice Frankfurter, that New
York must also honor the other portion of the Nevada judgment which
denied alimony.
JUSTICE HARLAN's DISSENT IN VANDERBILT
Justice Harlan neither agrees with the majority nor with Justice
Frankfurter. His opinion is most interesting reading, as it illustrates
only too well what varied views may be taken in this area of litigation.
Briefly stated, Justice Harlan says that New York cannot fail to honor
the alimony portion of the Nevada decree unless it finds that Mrs.
Vanderbilt was domiciled in New York at the time of the Nevada
divorce. He is not satisfied on the question of when Mrs. Vanderbilt
became domiciled in New York so as to become entitled to support
under New York law.
[D]ecision here, as I see it, turns on the domicile of Mrs.
Vanderbilt at the time of the divorce. On this question I am
left in some doubt. Section 116 5 -a of the New York Civil
Practice Act makes one year's residence necessary to suits for
support. This is amenable to the interpretation that New York
would not recognize Mrs. Vanderbilt as domiciled in that state
until the lapse of a year, that is, after the decree of divorce here
involved .... On the other band, the opinion below intimates
that the one-year residency can be regarded as merely a pro-
cedural prerequisite to filing suit under Sec. 1170-b, and does not
affect Mrs. Vanderbilt's status as a domiciliary of New York
ab initio. In view of this uncertainty in the state law, I would
remand to the state court for reconsideration in the light of the
above-stated principles. 42
Just why does it make a difference to Justice Harlan if Mrs.
Vanderbilt was a domiciliary in New York after, rather than at the
time of, the divorce? If the wife is a domiciliary of New York prior
to the divorce she is entitled under New York law to both the married
status and support. New York law has provided that even if the
married status is disrupted in an ex parte proceeding the wife may still
get support.
"'Id. at 424. "2 Id. at 434.
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Williams 1st, said Justice Harlan, in the interest of national uni-
formity, required New York to honor the disrupting of the marriage
status by Nevada in the ex parte proceeding. It is not good that
people are to be deemed married in one state and divorced in another.
However, the same interest in national uniformity does not exist when
it comes to the question of whether the former husband is to be freed
from the obligation to support in Nevada but held to such obligation
in New York. While New York had to accede to Nevada's action in
disrupting the married status of one of New York's domiciliaries, it
does not follow that New York must yield to the taking away of the
right to support of one of its domiciliaries by Nevada acting ex parte.
Justice Harlan is not, as was Justice Frankfurter, disturbed by the
fact that New York, in allowing support to the wife domiciled in its
borders at the time of divorce, would be honoring a marital right in
the face of a valid Nevada adjudication dissolving the marriage out of
which the right arose. However, "quite a different case is presented"4 3
where a wife becomes a New York domiciliary after the ex parte divorce
and then seeks support in the face of the Nevada decree denying such
right. Justice Harlan reasons as follows:
In such a case New York could not pretend to be assuring the
wife the mere survival of a pre-existing right, because the wife
could have had no pre-divorce rights in New York at all. New
York would merely be granting the wife a marital right in the
teeth of a valid Nevada adjudication that there is no marriage.
And, of course, at the time of the divorce New York would have
had no interest in the situation of any kind. In such a case,
therefore, it seems to me that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
would require New York to respect the Nevada judgment as to
support rights. 44
Since the majority decision placed no consequence on the time
when Mrs. Vanderbilt acquired her domicile in New York, Justice
Harlan says the effect of it is to "permit spouses divorced by valid
decrees to comb the country, after the divorce, in search of any State
where the divorcing spouse has property and which has favorable sup-
port laws, in order there to obtain alimony. ' '45
IV
WHEN THE WIFE ACQUIRES A NEw DOMICILE AND THE Hus-
BAND OBTAINS AN Ex PARTE DIVORCE IN THE STATE OF MARI-
TAL DOMICILE, THE STATE OF THE WIFE'S DOMICILE Is NOT
REQUIRED TO GIVE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THAT PORTION
42 Id. at 433. 4 Id. at 433-34.
"'Ibid. Of course property would not be essential if the former husband could
be found present in such state.
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OF THE DIVORCE DECREE WHICH AWARDED CUSTODY OF THE
CHILDREN TO THE HUSBAND.
MAY V. ANDERSON
We saw in the Vanderbilt case that the right to alimony is deemed a
personal.right which could not be taken from the wife by the divorcing
state in which she was neither served nor appeared. In May v. Ander-
son46 we are confronted with the wife's claim for custody of the children.
The majority of the Supreme Court found the same "personal" sanctity
in the claim of the wife for custody of children as it found in her claim
for alimony.
The Andersons were married in Wisconsin and maintained their
marital domicile in that state until December 1946. At that time mari-
tal troubles came to a head and it was agreed between the spouses
that the wife should take the children to Ohio and there think over
her course of action. By New Year's Day she phoned her husband that
she bad decided not to return to Wisconsin and would stay in Ohio.
The husband thereupon, in February 1947, obtained an ex parte divorce
in Wisconsin. The wife was not served in Wisconsin and did not
appear in the divorce proceeding. The decree awarded custody of the
children to the husband with visitation rights to the wife.
At the time the decree was entered the children were residing with
the wife in Ohio. The husband, armed with the decree and in com-
pany of a police officer, immediately went to Ohio, obtained the children,
and took them back to Wisconsin. They remained with him from
February 1947 to July 1951, when he brought them back to Ohio to
temporarily visit their mother. This time the wife refused to surrender
them and a habeas corpus action was initiated in the Ohio courts by the
husband to obtain possession of the children.
Under Ohio procedure a habeas corpus proceeding tests merely the
right to possession of the children and does not open up the question
of modification of a prior custody award.47 The issue before the court,
'"345 U.S. 528 (1953), 67 HARV. L. REV. 121, 52 MIcH. L. REV. 594 (1954),
38 MINN. L. REV. 273 (1954), 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 399 (1954).
17345 U.S. at 532. The procedure on habeas corpus proceedings varies in
different states. Thus, as was shown in Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947),
on a similar proceeding in New York the court may proceed to determine the
future custody of the child. Halvey did not present the question which is here
determined in May v. Anderson, namely, whether the domicile of one spouse
must give full faith and credit to an ex parte custody decree made in the domicile
of the other spouse.
In Halvey, the wife left the marital domicile of New York taking with her
a child of the marriage and established her domicile in Florida. There she in
due course obtained an ex parte divorce. The husband was neither served in
Florida nor appeared in the litigation. The Florida decree awarded custody of the
child to the mother. The day before the entry of the decree the father sur-
reptitiously took the child from Florida to New York. The wife then instituted
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then, was not to determine future custody, but to determine whether
any particular spouse was entitled to custody at the time of the habeas
corpus proceeding. The Ohio court stressed the domicile of the children
at the time of the divorce and custody decree. It found that the chil-
dren, although temporarily absent in Ohio when the husband obtained
the decree, were in fact domiciled in Wisconsin, the domicile of the
father. It accordingly found that the Wisconsin court had jurisdiction
to award custody to the father and therefore it saw no alternative but
to give the possession of the children to the father in line with the
Wisconsin decree.48
On certiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed the judg-
ment of the Ohio court and remanded the case for further action in
accordance with its opinion. The case brought forth a series of sep-
arate opinions. Justice Burton spoke for the majority. justice Frank-
furter filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissent in
which he was joined by Justice Reed. Justice Minton filed a separate
dissenting opinion.
MAJORITY OPINION IN MAY V. ANDERSON
Since the Ohio court was not passing upon future custody, that
question was not before the Supreme Court. The elemental question,
habeas corpus proceedings there. The New York court ordered that the wife
should have the custody of the child with visitation rights in the father and that
during certain periods of the year the father was entitled to keep the child with
him. The decree required the wife to put up a bond in the sum of $5,000 condi-
tioned on the delivery of the child in Florida for removal by the father to New
York for the periods when he had, pursuant to the decree, the right to keep the
child.
On certiorari the Supreme Court affirmed the New York judgment. The basis
of affirmance was that since the custody decree was not res judicata under the law
of Florida and could have been modified in that state on an application by the
father, it was likewise not res judicata in New York. The latter state, there-
fore, in making new provisions for custody was not failing to give full faith
and credit to the Florida decree. To what extent the Florida ex parte decree
could impose binding restrictions on the husband or circumscribe the power of
the New York court did not have to be and was not determined.
"
8 Just what the proper jurisdictional basis for a custody decree is has been
the subject of much legal writing. There are those who insist that only the
state of the domicile of the child can make a valid custody decree. There are
others who find that domicile is a poor criterion and that the residence of the
child within the state is the proper test. For an able discussion of this problem,
see Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRoB. 818 (1944). See also Stumberg, The Status of Children in the
Conflict of Laws, 8 U. CIH. L. Rv. 42 (1940); Note, Jurisdictional Basis of
Custody Decrees, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1024 (1940).
North Carolina is among those jurisdictions which follow the residence test.
Thus in Holmes v. Sanders. 246 N.C. 200, 201, 97 S.E.2d 683, 685 (1957), the
court adopted and quoted the language of Cardozo. J., when he spoke for the
New York Court of Appeals in Finley v. Finley, 240 N.Y. 429, 431, 148 N.E. 624.
625 (1925), and said: "The jurisdiction of a state to regulate the custody of
infants found within its territory does not depend upon the domicile of the parents.
It has its origin in the protection that is due to the incompetent or helpless . ...
For this, the residence of the child suffices, though the domicile be elsewhere."
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said Justice Burton, is "whether a court of a state where a mother is
neither domiciled, resident or present, may cut off her immediate right
to the care, custody, management and companionship of her minor
children without having jurisdiction over her in personam."49
The majority then refers to the Estin and Kreiger cases. There,
although the divorce had to be recognized in the state of the wife's
domicile, the Nevada court was held powerless to cut off in an ex parte
proceeding the wife's right to financial support. The right to support
was held to be a personal right. The Court now states that the wife's
right to custody is also a personal right. Thus Justice Burton says:
Rights far more precious to appellant than property rights will
be cut off if she is to be bound by the Wisconsin award of
custody.
In the instant case, we recognize that a mother's right to custody
of her children is a personal right entitled to at least as much
protection as her right to alimony. 50 (Emphasis added.)
The judgment of the Ohio court which honored the custody portion
of the Wisconsin divorce decree was therefore reversed.
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER'S CONCURRING OPINION IN
MAY V. ANDERSON
Justice Frankfurter concurred in the reversal of the Ohio court.
He stated, however, that he wished to make clear what was in fact
decided by the majority decision.
What is decided-the only thing the Court decides-is that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require Ohio, in disposing
of the custody of children in Ohio, to accept, in the circumstances
before us, the disposition made by Wisconsin. The Ohio court
felt itself so bound.51
Justice Frankfurter, while joining in a reversal, does not accept the
reasoning of the majority. To apply the legal theories relating to prop-
erty interests of a wife to her claim for custody of the children only
confuses the situation and leads to fallacious reasoning. Custody of
children is the peculiar responsibility of the state. This responsibility
as to children found within its borders may "not be foreclosed by a
prior adjudication reflecting another State's discharge of its responsibility
at another time."52
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE JACKSON IN
MAY v. ANDERSON
Justice Jackson's dissatisfaction with the majority decision is based
19 345 U.S. at 533. "0 Id. at 533-34.
r1Id. at 535. 52 Id. at 536.
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on the fact that, as he sees it, the majority is looking upon a custody
proceeding as "adjudicating rights in children as if they were chattels,"53
when, as a matter of fact, custody awards should be made on the basis of
"the best disposition possible for the welfare of the children."5 4
To speak of a court's "cutting off" a mother's right to custody
of her children, as if it raised problems similar to those involved
in "cutting off" her rights in a plot of ground, is to obliterate
these obvious distinctions. 5
The majority opinion, he says, finds the same jurisdictional require-'
ments for a custody decree that it would require for an in personam
money judgment. Not only does the majority opinion "author new
confusions" 58 but it seems to lead to a state of law "where possession
apparently is not merely nine points of the law but all of them and self
help the ultimate authority .... ,,57
In short, Justice Jackson finds that the majority places the "con-
venience of the leave taking parent [here the mother] . . . above the
welfare of the child ."58 He would affirm the judgment of the
Ohio court.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE MINTON IN
MAY V. ANDERSON
Justice Minton does not feel that the record has raised a jurisdic-
tional question which to him seems to be the basis of both the majority
and Justice Jackson's opinions. As he reads the Ohio law, parents
have equal rights to the custody of children in the absence of an order,
judgment, or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction fixing their
custody. Habeas corpus in Ohio is not a proper procedure for de-
termining custody. Hence, the only thing that need be done according
to Justice Minton is to find a valid judgment of a court giving one or
the other of the parents custody.
Such a judgment is found in the Wisconsin decree. The validity of
the decree, he says, has not been attacked by the mother. It was valid
on its face, it was not appealed from, and therefore there was nothing
for the Ohio court to do except to give it full faith and credit. This
the Ohio court did and therefore its judgment should be affirmed.
r Id. at 541.
"Ibid. To similar effect is the language of Justice Frankfurter in his con-
curring opinion in Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 617 (1947) : "The child's wel-
fare must be the controlling consideration whenever a court which can actually
lay hold of a child is appealed to on behalf of the child." And see also the
language of Justice Rutledge in Halvey, id. at 620: "I think that the controlling
consideration should be the best interests of the child . .. ."
" 345 U.S. at 541. 5"Id. at 542.
7 Id. at 539. F8 Ibid.
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V
WHEN THE HUSBAND OBTAINS AN EX PARTE DIVORCE IN A
STATE IN WHICH NEITHER SPOUSE Is DOMICILED, REMARRIES,
AND THEN DIES, HIS FIRST WIFE Is HIS LAWFUL WIDOW AND
ENTITLED TO PROPERTY INTERESTS IN THE STATE OF MARITAL
DOMICILE.
RICE V. RICE
At the time of the second trial in the Williams case, Mrs. Williams
was deceased. If, instead of she, it had been Mr. Williams who had
died, we might have found ourselves involved in litigation in North
Carolina in which both Mrs. Hendrix and Mrs. Williams claimed prop-
erty interests as the widow of Williams. That is exactly what hap-
pened in Rice v. Rice.59
The Rices were married in Connecticut where they maintained their
marital domicile until Rice left his wife, Lillian, and went to Reno,
where he obtained an ex parte divorce. He then married Hermonine,
but his enjoyment of the second spouse was short lived. He died at
the end of six months. Thereafter, both spouses claimed property in-
terests in Connecticut as Rice's widow. The Connecticut court, finding
Rice had not been doriiciled in Nevada, declared that Lillian was his
lawful widow and entitled to inherit the Connecticut real estate.
On certiorari the Supreme Court affirmed the state court. However,
four of the justices dissented. The majority, speaking by way of a per
curiam opinion, had little to say other than that Connecticut had
made a proper investigation into the jurisdiction of the divorcing court.
It had found that Rice bad not acquired a domicile in Nevada and
hence under the rule of Williams 2-nd the marriage relationship had not
been destroyed. The first spouse, therefore, was entitled to inherit the
Connecticut real estate. We are not told which spouse would have
recovered had the real estate involved been in Nevada instead of
Connecticut.60
VI
WHERE BOTH SPOUSES APPEAR IN THE DIVORCE ACTION
NEITHER CAN SUBSEQUENTLY ATTACK THE VALIDITY OF THE
DIVORCE ON THE GROUND THAT THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUISITE
OF DOMICILE WAS LACKING IN THE DIVORCING STATE.
" 336 U.S. 674 (1949). 1 SYRAcusE L. REv. 267, 23 CONN. 18AR J. 182 and
280, 29 B.U.L. REv. 553, 25 N.Y.U.L. REv. 86 (1950), 28 TEXAS L. REv. 439(1950).
"o While Justices Black, Douglas, Jackson and Rutledge dissented, only Justice
Jackson filed a dissenting opinion. For a discussion of that very pungent dissent
see Baer, The Aftermath of Williams v. North Carolina, 28 N.C.L. REv. 265, 287
(1950).
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SHERRER v. SHERRER AND COE V. COE
The Sherrer61 and Coe0 2 cases, decided by the Supreme Court in
1948, established what dissenting Justice Frankfurter characterized as
the "quickie" divorce. In each of the cases the complainant spouse left
the state of marital domicile and instituted divorce proceedings in a
foreign state. In each case the defendant spouse appeared in the di-
vorce proceedings.
In Sherrer the wife -was the moving party. She left the marital
domicile of Massachusetts and went to Florida, where she instituted the
divorce action. Mr. Sherrer appeared in the suit, filed an answer in
which he denied his wife's alleged Florida domicile, but failed to sup-
port his denial either by proof or cross examination. The Florida court
granted Mrs. Sherrer a divorce. The following year Sherrer, pursuant
to a local statute, instituted an action in a Massachusetts probate court
against Mrs. Sherrer in which he contended the Florida divorce was
invalid for lack of domicile. 'He prayed the court declare that he was
living apart from his wife for justifiable cause and that he be permitted
to convey his real estate under the applicable statute as if he were sole.
Mrs. Sherrer gave testimony in defense of the Florida decree, but the
probate court found that she had never been domiciled in Florida and
granted the relief requested. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts affirmed on the ground that the finding of lack of domicile in
Florida was supported by evidence and the full faith and credit clause
of the Constitution did not preclude Massachusetts from re-examining
the question of domicile.
In Coe the husband was the initial moving party. He left the
marital domicile of Massachusetts and made the journey to Nevada.
In due course he filed his divorce action in that state. Mrs. Coe
appeared in the suit, admitted as true the allegations of Coe's domicile,
and cross-claimed for a divorce in her favor on the ground of extreme
cruelty. She won the divorce decree on that ground.
Prior to the Nevada proceedings Mrs. Coe had obtained a support
order in Massachusetts compelling Coe to pay her $35 a week. The
divorce decree contained a provision that Coe was to continue the
$35 weekly payments as long as Mrs. Coe remained single. However,
61334 U.S. 343 (1948).
(2 334 U.S. 378 (1948). Practically all the leading law reviews carried either
notes, comments, or articles discussing the Sherrer and Coe cases. They were
hailed as manna from Heaven by those aspirants for divorce who could get their
unwanted spouse to appear in the divorce action either in person or by attorney.
Whether the comfort they derived from these decisions is to be long lasting remains
to be seen. For articles, see Carey and MacChesney, Divorces by the Consent of
the Parties, 43 ILL. L. REV. 608 (1948); Pollitt, Quick Divorce-A Study, 39
Ky. L.J. 289 (1951). See also, Notes, 27 N.C.L. REv. 134 (1948), 43 ILL. L.
R v. 608 (1948).
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after the Nevada decree, Coe defaulted in the payments and Mrs. Coe
brought action against him in Massachusetts in which she sought to
have him held in contempt of the Massachusetts support order. By way
of defense, Coe asserted that the said support order was no longer in
force by reason of the Nevada divorce decree. The probate court
sustained Coe's contention and dismissed the contempt proceedings. It
refused to permit Mrs. Coe to attack the validity of the Nevada decree
by establishing lack of domicile on the part of Coe in that state. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed. It held that evi-
dence tending to attack the alleged domicile in Nevada should be per-
mitted. On remand, the probate court found that neither of the Coes
had ever acquired a domicile in Nevada and that accordingly the
Nevada court had no jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage. Coe's mo-
tion to dismiss the contempt proceeding was now denied. On appeal
the state court affirmed. It found that the evidence supported the con-
clusion of lack of domicile in Nevada.
. The majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court reversed
the action of the state courts in both Sherrer and Coe. In each case
the state of Massachusetts had redetermined the question of domicile in
the divorcing state. In each case such redetermination was made at
the instance of one of the spouses who had appeared in the divorce
action. The parties, said Chief Justice Vinson speaking for the majority,
had had their "day in court."' 3 As to them the question of domicile in
the divorcing state was res judicata. Under the circumstances, Massa-
chusetts was required to give full faith and credit to the divorce decrees.
However vulnerable ex parte divorces may be, the Sherrer and
Coe cases rendered immune from attack by the spouses who appeared
in the litigation the "quickie" divorces of our divorce mill states. But
reliance on these decisions may well lead to a false sense of security.
It is one thing to say that a spouse who appeared in the litigation cannot
collaterally attack the decree. It is another to say that a state which
was not a party and which did not appear in the divorce proceedings
may not attack the decree and show that there was in fact no domicile
in the divorcing state. If, as in the Williams case, Williams' false
representation of domicile in Nevada did not bar North Carolina from
prosecuting him for bigamy, it is difficult to see how false assertions of
domicile by both spouses could bar such a prosecution.
Aside from the interests of the state, there may also be property in-
terests as well as status interests of individuals other than the immedi-
ate parties who appeared in the divorce proceeding which will be de-
termined by the validity of the divorce. What the rights of those
63334 U.S. at 350.
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persons are to collaterally attack the decree was not determined in
Sherrer and Coe.6 4
VII
WHEN BOTH SPOUSES APPEARED IN THE DIVORCE PROCEEDING
AND SUCH DIVORCE Is NOT SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK
BY A CHILD IN THE STATE WHERE IT Is GRANTED IT MAY NOT
BE ATTACKED BY THE CHILD IN ANY OTHER STATE EVEN
THOUGH THE PROPERTY INTERESTS OF THE CHILD DEPEND
UPON THE VALIDITY OF THE DIVORCE.
JOHNSON V. MUELBERGER
The right of a child whose property interests are dependent on the
validity of his parent's divorce to attack collaterally the divorce decree
was passed upon by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Muelberger.05
Eleanor Muelberger was the child of Johnson by his first marriage.
After the death of his first wife, Johnson married Madeline. They estab-
lished their marital domicile in New York state. After a few days,
Madeline went to Florida and obtained a divorce from Johnson. John-
son appeared in that suit but did not question the jurisdiction of the
Florida court. Following the divorce Johnson entered into a third
marriage with Genevieve and a year later he died. His will gave his
entire estate to his daughter, Eleanor. Genevieve filed notice that she
elected to take one third of the decedent's estate under the New York
Decedent Estate Law. The daughter contested this election, contending
that Johnson had not been validly divorced from Madeline and that
hence Genevieve was not his widow.
The New York surrogate before whom this contest was presented
determined that since the Florida divorce had been a contested pro-
ceeding it was valid and final in Florida and not subject to collateral
attack in New York. The New York appellate division affirmed the
surrogate's decree. The New York Court of Appeals was unanimous in
reversing. While recognizing that the parties themselves could not
attack the validity of the decree under the Sherrer and Coe cases, the
Court of Appeals found that under the law of the state of Florida, a
third party could collaterally attack the divorce decree by producing
proof of the fraudulent circumstances under which it was obtained. Since
" The dissenting opinion in Sherrer and Coe was written by Justice Frank-
furter and concurred in by Justice Murphy. Briefly stated, Justice Frankfurter
sees the majority opinion as fostering perjury by those who wish to dissolve
their bonds of matrimony and as unduly favoring the rich who can afford the
trip to Reno or Florida. For further discussion of the dissent, see Baer, The
Aftermath of Williams v. North Carolina, 28 N.C.L. REv. 265, 279 (1950).
65340 U.S. 581 (1951), 46 ILL. L. REv. 307, 50 MicH. L. Rzv. 465 (1952), 61
YALE L.J. 238 (1952).
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it concluded the decree was subject to attack by the daughter in Florida,
it would also be subject to atta&k by her in New York.
On certiorari the Supreme Court reversed the New York Court of
Appeals. The reversal stems from the fact that the Supreme Court
majority finds the Court of Appeals has misinterpreted the Florida law.
As the Supreme Court majority construes the Florida cases, the daugh-
ter would not be free to attack her father's divorce decree in Florida.
Consequently, it follows that the full faith and credit clause forbids her
to attack the decree in New York. Thus, Justice Reed speaking for
the Court said:
We conclude that Florida would not permit Mrs. Muelberger
[the daughter] to attack the Florida decree of divorce between
her father and his second wife as beyond the jurisdiction of the
rendering court. In that case New York cannot permit such an
attack by reason of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. When a
divorce cannot be attacked for lack of jurisdiction by parties
actually before the court or strangers in the rendering state, it
cannot .be attacked by them anywhere in the Union.6 -
A brief statement follows the opinion to the effect that Justice
Frankfurter dissents substantially for the reasons given in the opinion of
the New York Court of Appeals in the light of the views expressed by
him in the Sherrer and Coe cases.
Our various states differ as to whether or not third parties, such as
a daughter whose property interests are at stake, may collaterally attack'
a divorce granted by the state in a cause in which both spouses ap-
peared. 67 Therefore, it is apparent that the result in this type of case
is to be determined by the law of the state granting the divorce.
When a court of the standing of the New York Court of Appeals,
after consideration of the law of the divorcing state, concludes that the
said state would allow such a collateral attack, and when the United
States Supreme Court reverses because it finds that the law of the
divorcing state is exactly to the contrary, it is indeed difficult to predict
whether such collateral attack will be allowed. All the judges of the
Court of Appeals of New York apparently did not understand the law
of Florida. At least so say all the Supreme Court Justices who sat
on this case with the exception of Justice Frankfurter, who agrees with
the Court of Appeals.
340 U.S. at 589.
o See excellent note with large collection of cases, Standing of Children to
Attack Their Parent's Divorce Decree, 50 CoLum. L. Ray. 833 (1950). Illustrative
of the view that the child may attack the validity of his parent's decree is Matter
of Lindgren, 293 N.Y. 18, 55 N.E.2d 849 (1944) ; and of the view that he cannot
do so is Watson v. Watson, 172 S.C. 362. 174 S.E. 33 (1934).
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VIII
A DIVORCE DECREE PRESUMES JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER AND PARTIES. IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN A COLLATERAL
ATTACK BY A THIRD PARTY IN ANOTHER STATE, FINDINGS OF
FACT MUST BE MADE SHOWING LACK OF JURISDICTION IN THE
DIVORCING COURT.
COOK V. COOK
We saw in Johnson v. Muelberger8 that the majority of the Supreme
Court said the New York Court of Appeals misread the law of Florida.
In Cook v. Cook60 the members of the Supreme Court disagree among
themselves as to just what facts were found by the Vermont court in the
very case before them. The validity of a Florida divorce was at stake.
All the Justices agreed that the Vermont court found the divorce had
been obtained on a fraudulent representation of domicile in Florida by
the complainant wife. They all agreed that Vermont could not re-
litigate the issue of domicile in the particular case if the defendant in
the divorce suit had either been served in Florida or had appeared in
the litigation. They disagreed, however, as to whether or not the
Vermont court found as a fact that the divorce suit defendant had
neither been served nor appeared in the Florida litigation.
As the majority reads the Vermont record, no findings of fact had
been made by the Vermont court on either of those two critical juris-
dictional issues. Therefore, the Court sent the case back to the Vermont
state court with instructions to make the required findings. Justice
Frankfurter again accuses the majority of misreading. He is satisfied
that the Vermont trial court had found the divorce suit defendant was
not served and did not appear in the Florida litigation. He finds
that the Vermont Supreme Court "in its own Vermont way"1 0 had
acknowledged and accepted those negative findings when it came to its
conclusion that the Florida divorce was invalid.
Unfortunately, neither the opinion of the Vermont Supreme Court
nor of the United States Supreme Court gives us a copy of the record
in the Florida litigation or a verbatim copy of the actual findings of fact
made by the Vermont trial court. However, independent investigation
by the writer, which will be set out later herein, fully clarifies the situa-
tion. Meanwhile, we shall examine the facts of the Cook case.
Arthur Cook married Florence Mann in Elizabeth City, North
Carolina, February 5, 1943. He at that time understood that Florence
" See note 65 sispra.
342 U.S. 126 (1951), 6 RuTGEs L. REv. 615 (1952), 22 TENN. L. REV. 427
(1952).
70 342 U.S. at 130.
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had been divorced from one Albert Mann. Two months after his mar-
riage he learned there had been no divorce and that Florence was still
married to Mann. Cook thereupon suggested to Florence that she go to
Florida, stay there long enough to establish residence for divorce pur-
poses, obtain a divorce from Mann, and then they would remarry.
Florence, although never intending to make Florida her home, did
finally get a Florida divorce from Mann on September 10, 1943. She
promptly left Florida to rejoin Cook and on December 18, 1943, Cook
and Florence were again married in Elkton, Maryland. Cook paid part
of the expenses of the Florida divorce excursion. Between December
1943 and January 1949 Cook and Florence lived together for short
periods in all totalling about one year. In March 1949 Florence
brought an action for separate maintenance against Cook in Hawaii,
both parties then being in that territory. Florence obtained a separa-
tion decree which provided for certain support payments.
In December 1949 Cook filed a petition in the state of Vermont in
which he sought to have annulled his two marriages to Florence of
February 1943 and December 1943. Florence appeared in the action.
The Windsor County Court in which the annulment proceeding was
brought annulled the marriage of February 1943 but dismissed the
annulment petition as to the marriage of December 1943. On appeal
to the Supreme Court of Vermont, that court affirmed the annulment
of the first marriage but reversed the county court as to the second. It
declared the second marriage also null and void on the ground that the
Florida divorce decree of September 1943 was invalid because Florence
had not obtained a bona fide domicile in that state. She had, in fact,
practiced a fraud in the Florida court.
Referring to the rule of Williams 2nd the Vermont Supreme Court
said:
It was there held that the question of bona fide domicile was
open to attack, notwithstanding the full faith and credit clause
when the other spouse neither had appeared nor been served
with process in the state. The findings here do not show either
of these criteria.
It therefore follows that, under the findings as to domicile and
residence of the petitionee here in her divorce proceeding in
Florida and the deception by her upon the Florida court involving
its jurisdiction, this state is not bound to give recognition to that
decree and it is invalid. 71  (Emphasis added.)
It will be noted that in the language used by the Vermont Supreme
Court it is stated that "the findings here" (presumably those made
7' Cook v. Cook, 116 Vt. 374, 378-79, 76 A.2d 593, 595-96 (1950).
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by the trial court and accepted by the Vermont Supreme Court) do not
show that the divorce suit defendant was either served in Florida or
appeared in the litigation. However, it is significant that the Vermont
court does not say that the findings show the opposite-namely that the
defendant was not served in Florida and did not appear in the litiga-
tion.
Having determined that both of Cook's marriages to Florence were
invalid because Florence was at all times in question married to Mann,
the Vermont Supreme Court further declared 'that Cook's "unclean
hands" in promoting the fraudulent Florida divorce would not bar him
from obtaining a decree declaring the marriages null and void.
MAJORITY OPINION IN COOK
On certiorari the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case
to the Vermont court for further action in accordance with its opinion.
As previously stated, the reason for the remand was that the majority
of the Court failed to find in the Vermont proceedings any finding of
fact that Mann had not been served in the Florida suit and had not
appeared in the action. The majority state they do not know what took
place in Florida. In the absence of knowledge of what transpired in
Florida there could be no successful collateral attack on the decree.
The Florida decree is entitled to the presumption that the court had
jurisdiction over both the persons and subject matter. That presump-
tion has not been overcome. "[T]he burden of undermining the decree
of a sister state 'rests heavily upon the assailant.' "72
If one examines the record on certiorari before the Supreme Court
he will find set out verbatim the findings of fact of the Vermont trial
court. Nowhere in those findings could the writer discover either an
affirmative or negative finding of fact relating to the question of service
on or appearance by Mann. 73
72 342 U.S. at 128.
8 For the benefit of those readers who do not have available the United States
Supreme Court records, we publish below all portions of the Findings of Fact
made by the Vermont trial court which contain any reference to the Florida
divorce in question. The numbered paragraphs below correspond with the num-
bered paragraphs of the Findings of Fact.
"Upon a consideration of the statements of counsel, oral testimony and the
exhibits in the case the Court finds the following facts:
"4. About two months after the marriage the petitioner discovered that the
petitionee was the wife of Alfred H. Mann at the time of the marriage
and it was then suggested by the petitioner and agreed upon by the
parties that the petitionee should go to Florida, remain there long enough
to establish a residence for divorce purposes, secure a divorce from
Mann. and then return to the petitioner and they would marry again.
Part of the expense of the trip to Florida and of the divorce action was
paid by the petitioner. Florida was chosen as the place where the di-
vorce was to be obtained because Florida would be the nearest and best
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While the Vermont court had also held that the unclean hands of
Cook would not prevent him from having the marriage declared null
and void, the United States Supreme Court majority said,
We . . . reserve the question, discussed on argument, whether
respondent would now be in a position to attack the Florida
decree collaterally if it were found to be collusive and he par-
ticipated in the fraud.74
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER'S DISSENT IN COOK
As we intimated at the outset of the discussion of this case, Justice
Frankfurter dissented because, as he sees it, the majority misread the
decision of the Vermont Supreme Court. Had there been no finding
indicating that the Florida divorce was ex parte, Justice Frankfurter
said he would have joined with the majority. But he concludes there
was a finding that Mann, the divorce suit defendant, had not been
place to secure a divorce. The petitionee left Yorktown, Va. where
petitioner was and had been stationed and where the parties had lived
together since their marriage in April [this month erroneous . . . mar-
riage was in February] 1943, remained in Florida a short time, was at
the Philadelphia Naval Hospital between April and August 1943, returned
to Florida in August 1943. The petitioner went to Florida for a visit
in July or August. The petitionee was not then living in Jackson-
ville. The petitionee never intended to reside in Florida. Whatever
time was spent by the petitionee in Florida in 1943 was solely for
divorce purposes and with no intention on her part to establish a bona fide
residence there, and she intended to remain there only long enough to
obtain her divorce. This was understood and agreed upon by the pe-
titioner.
"5. The petitionee was granted a divorce from Mann by the Circuit Court
of the 11th judicial circuit in and for Dade County, Florida on Sep-
tember 10, 1943. This appears from petitioner's exhibit 2 which pur-
ports to be a copy of the decree and the same is hereby referred to and
made a part hereof and found as a fact. By this decree Mrs. Mann
was restored to her maiden name of Florence Monteford.
"6. Two or three days after the decree of divorce the parties met in Newport
News, Va.
"11. In the spring of 1943, when the parties agreed that the petitionee should
secure a divorce in Florida and when she consulted with Florida at-
torneys, she found that it was necessary for a person to have an intention
to remain permanently in Florida in order to gain a resident (sic) and
to fulfill that requirement the petitionee testified that she had lived in
Florida much longer than she actually had and that she had intentions
of remaining in Florida permanently and making her home when actually
she had intentions of returning to the petitioner and remarrying him.
The petitioner knew about her intentions to return to him as soon as the
divorce was obtained.
"12. That the petitionee did secure what purported to be a decree of divorce
by deceiving the Florida court as to the facts of her domicile.
"16. That under the Florida law it was necessary for the complaining party to
have actual residence in the state in order to secure a divorce and that
in order for the petitionee here to gain that residence she mu-t have had
an intention to live and remain in Florida which she did not have."
T,342 U.S. at 129.
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served in Florida and did not appear in the action. He is impressed
by the fact that the Vermont Supreme Court's decision was two years
after the United States Supreme Court decisions in Sherrer and Coe.
Speaking of those decisions and the action of the Vermont court he
says:
These were not puss-in-the-corner adjudications. It is incon-
ceivable that the Vermont courts did not know that the fraudulent
claim of domicile by a divorcing spouse is irrelevant to the en-
forceability in sister States of a decree of divorce if the other
spouse contests or consents to the proceeding leading to the
decree. When the Supreme Court of Vermont in 1950 finds a
decree of divorce to have been fraudulently obtained by a spouse
and says that there are no findings that the other spouse had
either appeared or been served with process, and rejects the
claim that the divorce decree must be respected by reason of un-
clean hands or condonation, plainly part of the case is the assump-
tion that this was not a Sherrer v. Sherrer or Coe v. Coe situa-
tion.75
As to the unclean hands aspect, concerning which the majority re-
served decision, Justice Frankfurter said:
And while Vermont could, if that State chose, deny relief to
Cook because of his "unclean hands," the Constitution of the
United States has nothing to do with that defense. 70
Justice Frankfurter then made what investigation reveals to have
been a poor guess. He stated:
The case now goes back to Vermont. It would not be surprising
if, in the proceedings to follow, it will be formally established
that inasmuch as Mann was neither served nor appeared in
Florida the decree was a nullity, to which the Constitution of
the United States does not require obedience from Vermont. 77
The truth of the matter is that although Mann was not served in
Florida he did appear in the divorce litigation through counsel. In the
answer filed in his behalf, Mann admitted the residence of Florence
as being bona fide in the state of Florida but denied he had deserted
her as alleged in the complaint. 78
75 Id. at 131-32.
76Id. at 131.
77 Id. at 132-33.
7' The writer acknowledges his indebtedness for the information contained in
this paragraph to the following persons who so kindly responded to his inquiries:
Attorney Henry Lincoln Johnson, Jr. of Washington, D. C., who argued the
case for Florence, the respondent on the certiorari before the Supreme Court(Letter dated January 22, 1958); Attorney Ray M. Watson of Miami, Florida,
who appeared as counsel for Albert Mann in the Florida divorce litigation (Letter
dated January 31, 1958) ; and E. B. Leatherman, clerk of the circuit court in Dade
County, Florida, in which court the divorce litigation took place (Letter dated
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The lesson of the Cook case is dear. A decree of divorce presumes
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. The burden rests
heavily on the party attacking the decree to show facts establishing a
lack of jurisdiction. A mere finding of lack of domicile in the divorcing
state may not be (as it was not in Cook) sufficient to sustain the col-
lateral attack on the decree. Safe practice would require counsel assail-
ing the validity of the divorce to ask the trial court to make findings of
fact on each of the following jurisdictional elements:
1. Were either of the parties domiciled in the divorcing state?
2. Was, or was not, the divorce suit defendant served in the divorcing
state ?
3. Did, or did not, the said* defendant appear in the divorce litiga-
gation? If the defendant did appear, let the findings show the
nature and extent of the appearance.
Ix
WHEN A DIVORCE DECREE PROVIDES FOR ALIMONY UNTIL RE-
MARRIAGE BY THE WIFE AND A REMARRIAGE TAKES PLACE
WHICH Is LATER ADJUDICATED NULL AND VOID BECAUSE THE
SECOND HUSBAND HAD NOT BEEN VALIDLY DIVORCED FROM His
WIFE, THE CONTINUANCE OF THE OBLIGATION TO PAY ALIMONY
Is TO BE DETERMINED BY THE INTERPRETATION THE DIVORCING
STATE PLACES ON THE LANGUAGE OF ITS DECREE.
SUTTON V. LEIB
In most states a final divorce decree may contain a provision that
the husband is to pay the wife alimony until her remarriage. If the
wife then enters into a marriage ceremony with another man whom she
assumed is free to marry her, she may later learn that he was in fact
not free because he had failed to obtain a valid divorce from his prior
spouse. The question then arises as to whether the wife's "remarriage"
is such a marriage as will terminate the husband's obligation to pay
alimony. That is the situation presented in Sutton v,. Leib.7
Mr. and Mrs. Leib were validly divorced by an Illinois court in 1939.
The decree provided that Leib was to make alimony payments to Mrs.
January 23, 1958). With Attorney Watson's permission we quote a portion
of his above mentioned letter:
The answer filed by me admitted the residence of the plaintiff, as being a
bona fide resident of the State of Florida and that the defendant resided in
the city of Portland, Oregon; admitted the marriage and the separation of
the parties as alleged. The answer denied that she had been a dutiful,
kind and affectionate wife and that he deserted her without cause; denied
that he failed to contribute to her support and maintenance. The answer
also waived notice of any and all other and further proceedings in the cause.
" 342 U.S. 402 (1952), 26 TEmp. L.Q. 80, 27 Tn. L. REv. 485 (1953).
19581
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Leib until she should remarry. On July 3, 1944, one Walter Henzel
obtained an ex parte divorce from his wife Dorothy in Nevada. Dorothy
was neither served nor appeared in the divorce proceeding. Immedi-
ately following his divorce Henzel married Mrs. Leib in Nevada. On
August 3, 1944, Dorothy instituted a separate maintenance action
against Henzel in New York. The suit resulted in a decree in her
favor, the New York court declaring the Nevada divorce null and void.
Mrs. Leib ceased living with -enzel immediately after the sum-
mons in Dorothy's suit was served on him and in January 1945 she
filed suit in New York to have her marriage to Henzel annulled.
Henzel appeared in this New York annulment proceeding and the New
York court, in due course, declared the Nevada marriage a nullity on
the ground that Dorothy was Henzel's wife at the time of the marriage
ceremony. Thereafter, in November 1947, Mrs. Leib validly married
Sherwood Sutton. The present action is a suit brought by her in the
federal district court in Illinois against Leib for alimony payments she
claims are due for the period August 1, 1944, to November 1947, the
date of her marriage to Sutton. The district court entered a summary
judgment in favor of Leib on the ground that Leib's obligation to pay
alimony was terminated by the marriage of Mrs. Leib to Henzel in
Nevada following Nevada's decree divorcing Henzel from Dorothy.
The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that Henzel's Nevada
divorce was valid in Nevada and therefore he was free to marry Mrs.
Leib in that state. As the court of appeals interpreted the Williams
case, the Nevada marriage was valid despite the New York decree de-
claring it annulled.
On certiorari the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case
for further action in accordance with its opinion. Reversal is predicated
on these grounds:
(1) If the Nevada court had had jurisdiction by personal service
in the state or appearance in the case of Henzel and the first
Mrs. Henzel, its decree of divorce would have been un-
assailable in other states.80
(2) So as to the New York decree annulling the marriage,
[between Henzel and Mrs. Leib] New York had such juris-
diction of the parties and its decree is entitled to full faith
throughout the Nation, in Nevada as well as in Illinois.8 '
(3) The New York invalidation of the Nevada divorce of the
Henzels [in the action by Dorothy against Henzel for sep-
arate maintenance] stands in the same position . 2
Thus the*Supreme Court concludes that the New York decree de-
claring the Nevada divorce invalid and annulling the marriage "must
10 342 U.S. at 408. 81 Ibid. 8sIbid.
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be given full faith and credit in Illinois."8  A reversal is therefore
clearly in order. But why is the cause remanded for further proceed-
ings? Since the marriage ceremony performed between Henzel and
Mrs. Leib in Nevada was invalid, why would not Mrs. Leib be entitled
to alimony payments until the date of her valid marriage to Sutton?
Because, says the Court, we do not know the effect under Illinois law
of the terms in the divorce decree, "for so long as plaintiff shall remain
unmarried."' 4 Does the obligation to pay alimony cease when the
divorced wife enters into any marriage ceremony with another even
though the said marriage is later annulled, or does it cease only if the
ceremony effectuates a valid marriage? Illinois law might properly
place either interpretation on those words. Hence the majority sends
the case back to the court of appeals with instructions that it render such
judgment as it finds would be warranted under Illinois law.
Justice Frankfurter concurred in the reversal but stated that the
determination of the Illinois law should not be made by a federal c6urt
in a case of this type. He would have the federal court hold the case
pending application by the plaintiff to the Illinois court for a ruling on
the crucial question. It is, of course, quite conceivable that the federal
court may reach a wrong conclusion as to what the Illinois court would
determine to be its law on the subject. It is this hazard that Justice
Frankfurter would avoid.
CONCLUSION
In 1949 Justice Jackson in his dissent in Rice v. Rice said as to the
matrimonial law then declared by the Supreme Court, "Confusion now
bath made his masterpiece." 85 In 1953 Justice Jackson again dissent-
ing in May v. Anderson said he feared the majority opinion would
"author new confusions." 80 With Justice Jackson's opinion this writer
has no quarrel. Nor does the writer for one moment suggest that he
has an answer to the complex problems in the field of divorce law which
would dissipate the confusion.
What has been attempted here is to collect the fact situations on
which the Supreme Court has ruled since the celebrated Williams cases
and to point out the theory of the majority and, in some instances, that of
the dissenting Justices. Very often the practicing lawyer will find that
the fact situation of his case parallels that of one of the cases herein
discussed. He may then, with that degree of confidence attorneys are
justified in having in our Supreme Court's decisions, advise his client
13 Id. at 409.
"' This language of the decree is quoted in the court of appeals decision. Sutton
v. Leib, 188 F.2d 766, 767 (1951).
336 U.S. 674, 676.
' 345 U.S. 528, 542.
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with assurance that his advice is in line with the law that has been
declared. He will of course still hazard the effect of changes in per-
sonnel of the Court as well as changes in the personal views of the in-
dividual Justices. As to those situations in which his own case is not
on all fours with one of the decided cases, the attorney must attempt
to reason from those announced principles which the Court has applied.
But when he is all through, the best he can say to his client is, "This is
the way the Court, on the basis of its past decisions, should logically
decide your case. However, I must tell you, the Supreme Court
Justices themselves frequently differ as to what is the logical con-
clusion !"
